Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?

George W. Downs, David M Rocke, Peter N. Barsoom

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

In the past few years many social scientists interested in cooperation have turned their attention to the problem of compliance in international regulatory regimes. Much of the empirical research in this area has been conducted by a group composed mainly of qualitative political scientists and scholars interested in international law. Its message is that (1) compliance is generally quite good; (2) this high level of compliance has been achieved with little attention to enforcement; (3) those compliance problems that do exist are best addressed as management rather than enforcement problems; and (4) the management rather than the enforcement approach holds the key to the evolution of future regulatory cooperation in the international system. As Oran Young notes, “A new understanding of the bases of compliance – one that treats compliance as a management problem rather than an enforcement problem and that has profound practical as well as theoretical implications – is making itself felt among students of international relations.” In short, not only are the dreary expectations born of factors such as relative gains concerns, collective action problems, anarchy, and fears of self-interested exploitation incorrect but also the enforcement limitations that always have appeared to sharply bound the contributions of international law and many international institutions now appear to have been exaggerated.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationInternational Law and International Relations
PublisherCambridge University Press
Pages92-112
Number of pages21
ISBN (Print)9780511808760, 0521679915, 9780521861861
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2007

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news
international law
management
anarchy
international system
political scientist
social scientist
collective behavior
international relations
empirical research
exploitation
anxiety
Group
student

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences(all)

Cite this

Downs, G. W., Rocke, D. M., & Barsoom, P. N. (2007). Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation? In International Law and International Relations (pp. 92-112). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808760.008

Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation? / Downs, George W.; Rocke, David M; Barsoom, Peter N.

International Law and International Relations. Cambridge University Press, 2007. p. 92-112.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Downs, GW, Rocke, DM & Barsoom, PN 2007, Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation? in International Law and International Relations. Cambridge University Press, pp. 92-112. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808760.008
Downs GW, Rocke DM, Barsoom PN. Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation? In International Law and International Relations. Cambridge University Press. 2007. p. 92-112 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808760.008
Downs, George W. ; Rocke, David M ; Barsoom, Peter N. / Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?. International Law and International Relations. Cambridge University Press, 2007. pp. 92-112
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